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  Honorable Jan E. DuBois, Senior Judge, United States*
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                           
BARRY, Circuit Judge
William Oscar Harris appeals from the District Court’s
denial of his motion to vacate an order of civil contempt that has
been in effect for over five years.  The order of contempt has its
roots in an underlying criminal proceeding in which Harris was
convicted of conspiracy and fraud and sentenced to 188 months’
imprisonment.  The clock on that 188-months, however, has yet to
begin ticking: for the past five years, Harris has been incarcerated
on the order of contempt that resulted from his refusal to comply
with an order entered in the underlying proceeding.  Because the
  Harris disputes the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a1
variety of ways, none of which is relevant here.  
3
Court structured the order of contempt so that it tolled the
commencement of Harris’s criminal sentence, only if and when the
contempt is lifted will he begin serving that sentence.  We will
affirm.
I.
Harris considers himself a member of the so-called Al-
Moroccan Empire, a group that believes the Uniform Commercial
Code can be deployed to gain access to secret “straw man” bank
accounts held by the United States Department of the Treasury;
indeed, Harris considers himself to be a “Moorish sovereign
being.”   These claimed beliefs, and actions taken in reliance upon1
them by Harris and his cohorts, have come at a price: on May 6,
2003, he and various of those cohorts were indicted on a panoply
of conspiracy and fraud counts arising from the production and
distribution of fraudulent financial documents.  
The events which ultimately led to this appeal began
following the indictment.  Harris and his co-conspirators sent out
bogus financial documents that purported to create liens and
judgments against the judges and prosecutors involved in the
underlying prosecution.  In response, the government moved for,
and the District Court granted, a temporary restraining order (and
eventually a permanent injunction) that prohibited Harris and his
co-conspirators from continuing those activities.  
Unfortunately, the restraining order and injunction did not
have the desired effect, and the harassing activities continued
unabated.  As a result, the District Court held a show-cause hearing
on April 13, 2004.  Following this hearing, the Court held Harris
and his co-conspirators in contempt, and ordered that they be
incarcerated until such time as they agreed, in writing, to stop
sending bogus liens and judgments.  Granting a five-day grace
period to allow for one last opportunity to comply, the Court
  Harris is the only one of the co-conspirators to continue2
to send out fraudulent documents; the others stopped, and the
orders of contempt were promptly lifted.
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ordered that Harris’s contempt begin on April 27, 2004.   The2
Court later dropped the writing requirement, stating that it would
lift the contempt if Harris simply “affirmatively ceased sending out
new documents.”  (App. 163a.)
Trial in the underlying criminal proceeding began on June
7, 2004.  On July 2, 2004, Harris was convicted on all counts of the
indictment, and was subsequently sentenced to 188 months’
imprisonment with that sentence to follow his confinement for civil
contempt.  He appealed, and we affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Harris has continued to send out bogus documents and,
accordingly, has remained incarcerated for contempt for the
entirety of the past five years.  In November 2007, he filed a pro se
motion that recycled his oft-rejected arguments about the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, see supra note 1, a motion the
District Court construed as one to terminate Harris’s sentence for
civil contempt – and, as we characterize it for purposes of this
Opinion, a motion to vacate the order of civil contempt.  The Court
gave careful consideration to each of Harris’s arguments, and on
February 20, 2008 denied the motion.  We cannot overemphasize
the fact, and fact it be, that throughout the proceedings before the
District Court, the Court scrupulously avoided basing its finding of
contempt on any conduct directed by Harris against it and at all
times displayed extraordinary patience.  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§
401 and 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the Court’s legal conclusions de novo, and will reverse
“only where the decision is based on an error of law or a finding of
fact that is clearly erroneous.”  Marshak v. Treadwell, — F.3d —
(3d Cir. 2009). 
II.
5It has long been recognized that courts possess the inherent
authority to hold persons in contempt.  See United States v.
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812) (“To fine for contempt - imprison
for contumacy - inforce the observance of order . . . are powers
which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others.”); see also Int’l Union,
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994).
There are two types of contempt, civil and criminal, and it is not
always easy to distinguish between them: as the Supreme Court has
observed, the distinction is “somewhat elusive.”  Bagwell, 512 U.S.
at 830.  
Civil contempt orders are intended to be coercive or
compensatory in nature, and do not require, inter alia, a jury trial.
Rather, civil contempt is imposed by the judge upon a finding that
one has failed to comply with a valid court order.  See United
States v. Shillitani, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966) (“The conditional
nature of the imprisonment – based entirely upon the contemnor’s
continued defiance – justifies holding civil contempt proceedings
absent the safeguards of indictment and jury, provided that the
usual due process requirements are met.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 (“[C]ivil contempt
sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future compliance
with a court order, are considered to be coercive and avoidable
through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil
proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Neither a
jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.”).  
With civil contempt, the contemnor will be released subject
to compliance with some condition.  He is thus understood, in a by-
now familiar observation, to “carr[y] the keys of his prison in his
own pocket.”  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).  At the same time, the civil contempt power is
regarded as “uniquely . . . liable to abuse” because such
“proceedings leave the offended judge solely responsible for
identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the
contumacious conduct.”  Id. at 831 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).  
Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is punitive in nature
6– it punishes for some past contumacious act.  A person subject to
criminal contempt is entitled to greater procedural protections than
a person subject to civil contempt: most importantly, the purported
contemnor has a right to trial by jury.  See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968).  
III.
Harris claims that his order of contempt is de facto an order
of criminal contempt because it is, or has become over the passage
of time, punitive in nature.  He thus argues that for two reasons the
order must be lifted because criminal contempt requires a trial by
jury and other procedural protections that have not been afforded
to him. 
Harris contends, first, that the District Court could not
continue to hold him in contempt after the termination of the
underlying proceeding.  He also contends that regardless of the
merits of the order of contempt and his admitted ability to comply
with that order, due process imposes a freestanding and discernible
temporal limitation on the Court’s contempt authority.  We
disagree with both contentions, and address them in order. 
A. 
It is Harris’s contention that a district court cannot continue
to hold a person in contempt once the underlying proceeding that
gave rise to the contempt has terminated.  Here, it is undisputed
that the underlying proceeding is final and complete: Harris has
been convicted and sentenced, and his appeal was unsuccessful.
Thus, he posits, the Court exceeded its authority in continuing the
contempt.
The precise nature and contours of Harris’s argument are a
bit muddled.  Strictly speaking, he does not make a jurisdictional
  The District Court quite clearly had jurisdiction to issue3
and continue the order of contempt.  18 U.S.C. § 401 provides that:
A court of the United States shall have power to
punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as – 
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence
or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their
official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
Jurisdictionally speaking, the District Court had the power to hold
Harris in contempt, and confine him continually for that contempt,
in light of Harris’s “resistance to its lawful . . . order.”  Id. 
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argument,  although what he argues does relate to a court’s power:3
in essence, the argument goes, a court’s power over the parties
before it necessarily terminates at the conclusion of the proceeding.
In support of his position, he plucks a quote from the Fifth
Circuit:“[i]f the civil contempt proceeding is coercive in nature, the
general rule is that it is mooted when the proceeding out of which
it arises is terminated.”  Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters.,
Inc., 826 F.2d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 1987). 
We do not disagree with this unremarkable proposition, as
most orders of civil contempt are inextricably intertwined with the
underlying proceeding – civil or criminal – and thus rendered moot
by that proceeding’s end.  To take a classic scenario, a recalcitrant
witness is haled before a grand jury, and refuses to testify despite
being granted immunity.  If such a “witness” persists in his refusal
to testify, a court will often hold him in contempt until such time
as he complies.  Such a contempt, it is universally acknowledged,
must end when the underlying proceeding is over: when the grand
jury’s term expires, the recalcitrant witness can no longer comply
with the order and purge the contempt, so coercion has become a
factual impossibility.
  In Petroleos Mexicanos, the contempt did not end with the4
termination of the underlying proceeding because it was partially
compensatory in nature and thus had a relevance independent of
and extrinsic to the underlying proceeding.  826 F.2d at 400 (“This
distinction rests upon the fact that the harm or injury that gives rise
to the need for compensation continued unredressed at the end of
the underlying litigation while the need for getting a party to act in
the underlying litigation necessarily terminates when that litigation
ends.”).
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But other contempt orders are not mooted by the termination
of the underlying proceeding.  Indeed, the very case cited by
Harris, Petroleos Mexicanos, illustrates that orders of civil
contempt can outlive the underlying proceeding: the Fifth Circuit
found that the termination of the underlying proceeding did not
require that the contempt be lifted.   See id. at 400.4
Similarly, the termination of the underlying proceeding here
has not rendered the order of contempt moot.  Harris can, and he
surely should, stop his harassment of the prosecutors and judges
involved in his case.  Accordingly, the purpose and concomitant
coercive intent of the order of contempt remain alive and well.
Because the District Court’s jurisdiction cannot seriously be
challenged, and because we do not take issue with the Court’s
continued exercise of that jurisdiction, the Court did not abuse its
discretion, under the circumstances before us, in refusing to vacate
the order of contempt on this ground. 
B.
Stripped to its essence, Harris’s second contention is that
due process places a temporal limitation on the amount of time for
which a civil contemnor can be confined, regardless of the validity
of the underlying order on the merits and the contemnor’s ability
to comply with that order.  Harris asserts that a coercive civil
contempt necessarily becomes punitive after the passage of some
period of time, and points to the eighteen-month period of
confinement established by Congress for recalcitrant witnesses as
an appropriate presumptive benchmark.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1826.
Because he has been incarcerated for more than five years, Harris
  Due process would require, of course, that the courthouse5
doors be open for a contemnor to challenge the underlying order on
the merits and prove a factual inability to comply with the order.
Those arguments, however, are not before us here.  
 Other courts, before Bagwell, adopted such a rule.  See6
Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1976) (adopting a
“substantial likelihood that continued confinement is no longer
serving its purpose” test); Catena v. Seidl, 321 A.2d 225, 228-29
(N.J. 1974) (listing age, health, and length of confinement as
relevant factors to the analysis of when coercive civil contempt
becomes punitive).
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contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion.     
We reject that contention.  As an initial matter, it is critical
to emphasize two undisputed facts: first, the underlying order, on
the merits, is unquestionably valid and eminently appropriate;
second, as Harris himself admits, he is able to comply with the
order at any time.   There is simply no better example of a situation5
where a contemnor “‘“carries the keys of his prison in his own
pocket.”’” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (quoting Gompers v. Buck’s
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (quoting In re Nevitt,
117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902))).  
Harris argues, however, that due process requires that a
district court lift a contempt order if there is no substantial
likelihood that the contemnor will comply with the order.    In6
support of his argument, he points to our thirty-year old decision in
In re Grand Jury Investigation (Braun), 600 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.
1979) (hereinafter “Braun”).  In Braun, a recalcitrant witness was
given immunity from prosecution but refused to testify before the
grand jury.  After being held in contempt, the contemnor
challenged his continued confinement, arguing that due process
required that he be released before the expiration of the eighteen-
month maximum period of confinement provided for in the
Recalcitrant Witness Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826.  We rejected that
contention, and affirmed the district court’s refusal to lift the
contempt.  
In so doing, we observed that even when “the witness can
10
still purge himself of contempt by testifying, he may no longer be
held once it becomes evident that the duress will not succeed in
breaking his silence.”  Braun, 600 F.2d at 424.  At the same time,
we noted that “[o]bviously, the civil contempt power would be
completely eviscerated were a defiant witness able to secure his
release merely by boldly asserting that he will never comply with
the court’s order.”  Id. at 425.  We then observed that other
jurisdictions had placed on the contemnor the “burden of
establishing that there is no ‘substantial likelihood’ that continued
confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose.”  Id.
For several reasons, we do not believe that Braun requires
us to disturb the District Court’s decision.  For one thing, Braun is
distinguishable in that it is a recalcitrant witness case: the ultimate
holding in Braun arose squarely from the Recalcitrant Witness
Statute.  See id. (noting that the “often perplexing” due process
issue in Braun “is ameliorated in the present case” by the
Recalcitrant Witness Statute).  That statute is wholly inapplicable
here for one obvious reason: Harris is not, and was not, a
recalcitrant witness. 
Moreover, any language in Braun indicating our approval of
the “no substantial likelihood” test has been seriously undermined
in the past thirty years even were that language not dicta, which it
is.  In Bagwell, for example, the Supreme Court clearly indicated
that there is no temporal limitation on the amount of time that a
contemnor can be confined for civil contempt when it is undisputed
that the contemnor has the ability to comply with the underlying
order:  
The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction
. . . involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until
he complies with an affirmative command such as an
order to pay alimony, or to surrender property
ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a
conveyance.  
512 U.S. at 828 (internal citations and quotations omitted)
(emphasis added).  Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court
emphasized, “the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and
obtain his release . . . and thus carries the keys of his prison in his
  In earlier and later events in the Chadwick litigation,7
Chadwick did claim a factual inability to comply – i.e., that he did
not actually have control over the disputed assets.  The Supreme
Court recently denied his petition for a writ of certiorari from the
latest round of litigation in the Pennsylvania state courts.  See
Chadwick v. Holm, 08-1056 (cert. denied April 20, 2009).  The
Court had years earlier denied his petition for a writ of certiorari
from our decision.  See Chadwick v. Janecka, 02-1346 (cert. denied
April 28, 2003).  On July 10, 2009, more than fourteen years after
he was initially incarcerated for contempt, he was released.  
  We recognize that because of the habeas posture of the8
case, Chadwick’s holding is limited to concluding that the Supreme
Court had not clearly established due process limitations on the
length of time a contemnor can be held in civil contempt.
Nonetheless, we find Chadwick’s discussion of the issues to be
both powerful and persuasive.
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own pocket.”  Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002), we
had occasion to discuss the implications of Bagwell.  The petitioner
in that habeas action, Mr. Chadwick, had been involved in a
divorce in state court, and was found to have improperly
transferred marital assets to third parties for the purpose of
shielding them from the divorce court’s jurisdiction (and,
ultimately, his ex-wife’s possession).  In response, the state court
held petitioner in contempt, ordering him incarcerated until he
turned over the assets.  Significant litigation concerning his
confinement followed, and, after nearly seven years of
confinement, his case reached us.  
Petitioner did not argue that he was incapable of complying
with the state court’s order to turn over the assets, but rather that
due process limited the amount of time for which the court could
confine him for civil contempt.   The case was before us on habeas7
review, and we rejected petitioner’s claim, concluding that the state
court’s determination was not “contrary to . . . clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”   Id. at 606-07.8
In the course of reaching this holding, then-Judge now
 Chadwick also discussed Braun, noting that, “[i]n Braun,9
a panel of our court [agreed] . . . that a civil contemnor who is
simply unwilling to comply with the court order must be released
after the passage of a certain period of time.”  Chadwick, 312 at
612 n.13; see also id. at 612-13 (indicating that Braun cited
12
Justice Alito squarely addressed Bagwell and its “indefinitely until
he complies” language:
[Petitioner], however, urges us not to take
Bagwell at face value.  He contends that the phrase
‘indefinitely until he complies’ in Bagwell does not
mean ‘permanently and without other recourse.’
Instead, he maintains that ‘[t]he word ‘indefinitely’
is apparently used in its most precise sense, to mean
‘with no predetermined ending date.’’  We have no
quarrel with this definition, but this understanding of
the term ‘indefinitely’ does not explain away the
critical statement in Bagwell that a civil contemnor
may be confined ‘indefinitely until he complies.’  
The meaning of the statement in Bagwell that
a contemnor may be held ‘indefinitely until he
complies’ is perfectly clear.  The phrase ‘until he
complies’ sets the point in time when confinement
must cease.  The term ‘indefinitely’ describes the
length of confinement up to that point, namely, a
period ‘having no exact limits,’ because the end
point (the time of compliance) cannot be foretold.
Mr. Chadwick’s contrary interpretation – that
‘indefinitely until he complies’ means ‘indefinitely
until he complies or it becomes apparent that he is
never going to comply’ – is insupportable.
Id. at 608 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in
Bagwell).
We fully agree with this analysis of Bagwell, and thus
conclude that, under the circumstances before us, the order of
contempt was not only validly issued but validly continued.   Any9
approvingly, but in dicta, the “no substantial likelihood” test).  In
light of the habeas posture in which Chadwick presented itself, we
did not decide whether Bagwell had rejected Harris’s interpretation
of Braun.  See Chadwick, 312 F.3d at 613 (“We have no need here
to decide whether [Braun] remains good law in light of Bagwell.”).
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incidental punitive consequences arising from the contempt can be
squarely laid at Harris’s own feet.  We will not, as the District
Court said so well, “dissolve a lawful order . . . merely because the
contemnor persists in violating it.”  (App. 165a.)  Cf. Shillitani, 384
U.S. at 370 (“While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and
deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the court
conditions release upon the contemnor’s willingness to testify.”)
(emphasis added).  The Constitution does not require such a
perverse result.
Additionally, the order of contempt is not punitive simply
because there are repeated and discrete violations of the underlying
order.  Indeed, “[m]ost contempt sanctions . . . to some extent
punish a prior offense as well as coerce an offender’s future
obedience.”  Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828.  Because a court would not
be justified in holding a person in contempt until he demonstrated
a refusal to comply with an order, prior instances of disobedience
will almost always accompany an order of contempt.  Thus, the fact
of prior instances does not mean that the order of contempt
punishes; to the contrary, a valid order of civil contempt such as
that before us reacts to prior instances of disobedience by seeking
to compel and coerce future obedience.  See, e.g., id. at 835 (“But
the distinction between coercion of affirmative acts and
punishment of prohibited conduct is difficult to apply when
conduct that can recur is involved, or when an injunction contains
both mandatory and prohibitory provisions.”).
We cannot conclude that an order such as the one at issue
here could ever lose all of its coercive effect.  After all, the order
requires Harris to simply stop what he is doing, with the District
Court indicating that a period of inaction is all that is needed for it
to lift the contempt.  Considering the benefit to be gained by Harris
in complying with the Court’s order – to wit, the lifting of the
contempt and the commencement of the underlying sentence – we
  United States v. Shillitani supports this conclusion.  In10
Shillitani, two putative witnesses were subpoenaed to testify before
the grand jury.  After they refused to testify on Fifth Amendment
grounds, they were granted immunity.  Still, they refused to testify.
Accordingly, the court found them in contempt, ordered them
incarcerated, and stated that they would be released upon: (a) a
period of two years, (b) the conclusion of the grand jury
investigating the crimes at issue, or (c) at such time as they agreed
to testify.
The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of this procedure,
noting that “[w]hen the petitioners carry the keys of their prison in
their own pockets, the action is essentially a civil remedy designed
for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been
exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees.”
384 U.S. at 368 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Indeed,
the Court, prior to the passage of the Recalcitrant Witness Statute
discussed supra, went even further, stating:
[w]here contempt consists of a refusal to obey a
court order to testify at any stage in judicial
proceedings, the witness may be confined until
compliance.  The conditional nature of the
imprisonment – based entirely upon the contemnor’s
continued defiance – justifies holding civil contempt
proceedings absent the safeguards of indictment and
jury. . . .
Id. at 370-71 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis
added).
Ultimately, the contemnors were ordered released because
the term of the grand jury had expired.  But the Court seemed
comfortable in concluding that the confinement could have
continued if a successor grand jury had been instituted.  Id. at 371
n.8 (“[T]he sentences of imprisonment may be continued or
reimposed if the witnesses adhere to their refusal to testify before
a successor grand jury.”). 
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do not believe that the circumstances of this case present any
constitutional problem.  10
In the final analysis, we simply cannot countenance a
situation where a contemnor’s insistence on continuing his
contumacious conduct inures to his benefit, and we surely do not
  Our conclusion is in line with the conclusion of the Court11
of Appeals to have most recently considered the issue.  In
Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2006), the contemnor
was a defendant indicted for securities fraud and charged in various
civil proceedings initiated by the SEC.  During the course of these
actions, he was ordered to turn over various personal and corporate
assets and records but refused to do so, invoking the Fifth
Amendment.  His Fifth Amendment argument was rejected, but he
persisted in his refusal to turn over the documents.  For over six
years, the stubborn contemnor sat in jail.  Unable to convince the
court that he was incapable of complying with the order, he
challenged his confinement on, inter alia, due process grounds. 
The Second Circuit squarely rejected the contention “that,
simply by the nature of its length,” a term of civil confinement can
offend due process.  Id. at 110.  The majority noted that the “length
of coercive incarceration” – over six years in Armstrong – “is not
dispositive of its lawfulness.”  Id.  Indeed, the majority, after noting
that the concurring opinion stated that “there is a limit to how long
[a person] can be incarcerated,” unambiguously stated: “We
disagree.”  Id. at 111 n.9. 
 The majority did find that a long period of noncompliance
might give rise to an inference that a contemnor was incapable of
complying.  Id. at 110-11. But Harris is not arguing – and will
never be able to argue – a factual inability to comply.  Accordingly,
we have no occasion to decide whether an extended period of
noncompliance might give rise to a presumption of an inability to
15
believe that the Constitution requires such a result.  To the
contrary, a valid order of civil contempt does not become punitive
simply because the contemnor persists in punishing himself.  We,
therefore, hold that an order of civil contempt will only become
punitive if a contemnor is unable to comply with the order, or if the
circumstances indicate that a court is maintaining the contempt for
an impermissible punitive purpose.
Harris has made the choice to do what he is doing, a choice
which thumbs its nose at the District Court’s authority.  The order
of contempt seeks to coerce him into making a different choice –
which is precisely the justification for and purpose of civil
contempt.  Due process is not offended by that order.    While we11
comply.  
 Thus, we suggest that the distinguished judge who12
authored the concurring opinion believes that we say more than we
believe we do.  We will allow our Opinion to speak for itself.  
16
can conceive of circumstances where indefinite detention pursuant
to a court’s civil contempt authority may be so attenuated from its
original, valid purpose as to constitute a due process violation, we
see no such violation here.   Harris can comply with the order in12
question at any time and the order will be lifted. 
IV.
We will affirm the February 20, 2008 order of the District
Court.
17
United States v. Harris, No. 08-1553
DuBois, District Judge, concurring
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write
separately to address the due process standard applicable in civil
contempt cases involving coercive confinement. In my view, such
confinement, while indefinite, is not limitless. To the contrary, I am
persuaded that when a civil contempt order ceases to have a
coercive effect, it loses its remedial purpose and becomes punitive.
Under those circumstances, because “it is well established that
criminal penalties may not be imposed in civil contempt
proceedings,” the contemnor must be released and, if deemed
appropriate, prosecuted separately for criminal contempt. In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 423-24
(3d Cir. 1979). As we held in Braun, the burden of establishing that
there is “no substantial likelihood” that continued confinement
would accomplish its coercive purpose falls to the contemnor. Id.
at 425 (internal quotations omitted).
In rejecting the existence of due process limitations on the
continuation of civil contempt confinement, the majority relies in
large part on the reasoning of Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597
(3d Cir. 2002), and on Chadwick’s interpretation of International
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994), the Supreme Court’s most recent decision concerning the
differences between civil and criminal contempt. I believe this
reliance to be misplaced.
The majority takes Chadwick’s lead in focusing on the
following language in Bagwell:
The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction
. . . involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until
he complies with an affirmative command such as an
order “to pay alimony, or to surrender property
ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a
conveyance.” 
 I note that on July 10, 2009, Judge Joseph P. Cronin, Jr.,13
President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County, granted H. Beatty Chadwick’s most recent petition for writ
of habeas corpus and released him after more than fourteen years
of civil contempt confinement. In an opinion issued that date,
Judge Cronin found, based on the record in the case and the
evidence presented at a hearing on July 7, 2009, that Chadwick had
the present ability to comply with the underlying order which
18
512 U.S. at 828 (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)) (emphasis added); Chadwick, 312 F.3d
at 608; Majority Op., supra, at 12. In Chadwick, we rejected the
petitioner’s contention that the phrase “indefinitely until he
complies” means “indefinitely until he complies or it becomes
apparent that he is never going to comply.” 312 F.3d at 608. We
further described the meaning of the “indefinitely until he
complies” phrase as “perfectly clear,” concluding that the language
“sets the point in time at which confinement must cease.” Id.
Although Chadwick seems to construe Bagwell’s “until he
complies” language as setting the only point at which civil
contempt confinement must cease, that analysis was not necessary
to the holding in Chadwick. Moreover, Chadwick, itself,
recognized a second point at which civil contempt confinement
must terminate—when the contemnor proves that he is unable to
comply. Chadwick, 312 F.3d at 609-11 (analyzing Maggio v. Zeitz,
333 U.S. 56 (1948)).  
In Chadwick we reviewed the contemnor’s petition for
habeas corpus under the restrictive standard set forth in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which precludes
federal relief unless the petitioner can prove that the state court’s
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Chadwick, 312
F.3d at 606-07. Applying that standard, we denied relief to
Chadwick on the ground that Bagwell did not “clearly establish[]”
the existence of a due process limitation on civil contempt
confinement and that no other Supreme Court case had “endorsed
the proposition that confinement for civil contempt must cease
when there is ‘no substantial likelihood of compliance.’”  Id. at13
required him to deposit approximately 2.5 million dollars in an
escrow account under the jurisdiction of the court. Judge Cronin
nevertheless released Chadwick, concluding that Chadwick’s
continued refusal to comply with the contempt order despite
fourteen years of incarceration “demonstrates that the [contempt
order] . . . has lost its present coercive effect and that it is unlikely
that the continued incarceration of Petitioner Chadwick will result
in his compliance with [that order].” Chadwick v. Green, Civ. No.
09-2134 (Del. County Ct. Com. Pl. July 10, 2009).      
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608, 613. Chadwick expressly reserved ruling on whether Bagwell
undermined Braun’s due process holding. Id. at 613.  
 When read in context, the language in Bagwell does not
mean that civil contempt can continue indefinitely without raising
due process concerns. In fact, Bagwell neither endorses nor
precludes the existence of due process limitations on the
continuation of civil contempt confinement because that issue was
not before the Court. Bagwell dealt with the characterization of a
contempt sanction as civil or criminal at its imposition; the issue
was not the termination of an otherwise lawful coercive contempt
sanction. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 823. Moreover, Bagwell addressed
the imposition of fines, not incarceration, and discussed coercive
incarceration for comparative purposes only. Id. at 823, 828. The
Bagwell Court had no occasion to consider whether there existed
any limitations—due process or otherwise—on the continuation of
indefinite civil contempt confinement.
Although the Supreme Court has not considered this issue,
the Third Circuit has done so. In Braun, we recognized that due
process imposes an outer limit, albeit a variable one, on the length
of indefinite civil contempt confinement.  “Because the
contemnor’s imprisonment is said to be justified as a coercive
measure, [the rule is] that when the confinement has lost its
coercive force it essentially becomes punitive, and the contemnor
must then be released since it is well established that criminal
penalties may not be imposed in civil contempt proceedings.”
Braun, 600 F.2d at 423-24, 425 (citations omitted). To obtain
release, “the contemnor must . . . establish[] that there is no
‘substantial likelihood’ that continued confinement would
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accomplish its coercive purpose.” Id. at 425. The contemnor’s
burden is not satisfied where he does no more than “boldly assert[]
that he will never comply with the court’s order” or where his
obstinacy “can be rationally attributed to considerations other than
an adamant refusal to purge himself of contempt despite the
consequences.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Braun is, as the majority notes, a recalcitrant witness case,
which was governed by the eighteen-month limit on civil contempt
confinement provided in the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a).  For this reason, the majority states that the due
process holding on which I rely is dicta. I disagree with that
conclusion. The analysis in Braun clearly has three parts, all of
which are necessary to the holding in that case. First, we stated the
due process standard—that civil contempt confinement must
terminate when it loses the remedial coercive effect that justified
its imposition. Id. at 423-25. We observed, however, that applying
the standard in practice was a “perplexing task” because “the point
at which coercive imprisonment actually ceases to be coercive and
essentially becomes punitive is not readily discernible.” Id. at 425.
For that reason, we ruled that it was appropriate for the contemnor
to bear the burden of establishing that there was no substantial
likelihood that continued confinement would accomplish its
coercive purpose. Id. 
In the next part of the opinion, we discussed the relevance
of the eighteen-month limit imposed by the Recalcitrant Witness
Statute and determined that “Congress has, in effect, addressed
essentially the same problem that courts must tackle under a due
process analysis, and has thereby filled the void that existed under
prior practice, where there was a possibility that unconscionable,
indeterminate periods of confinement might be imposed for civil
contempt.” Id. at 427. We held that this legislative determination
regarding the point at which the continued confinement of
recalcitrant witnesses becomes punitive must be accorded
substantial deference. Id. We did not, however, exempt recalcitrant
witnesses from due process protection. Instead, we specifically
stated that “a court may not abdicate its responsibilities under the
Constitution simply because Congress has legislated in a particular
area.” Id. 
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In the final part of the opinion, and in accordance with the
pronouncement that a court may not abdicate its responsibilities
under the Constitution, we considered the merits of Braun’s due
process challenge to his continued incarceration. The ultimate
holding in Braun was that “Braun ha[d] not alleged any facts that
would warrant a departure, at least at [that] time, from the
eighteen-month benchmark laid down by Congress.” Id. at 427. In
other words, we applied the due process standard to the facts
presented and concluded that Braun had not met his “heavy”
burden of establishing that his continued confinement had “no
substantial likelihood” of coercing his testimony. Id. at 425, 427-
28. For this reason, I do not believe Braun’s due process holding
to be dicta.
The due process standard articulated and applied in Braun
has not been overruled by the Third Circuit sitting en banc, and
there is no basis for arguing that the Supreme Court abrogated the
standard in Bagwell. In civil contempt cases not covered by the
Recalcitrant Witness Statute, such as this one, due process is the
only existing limitation on the continuation of  “unconscionable,
indeterminate periods of confinement,” id. at 427, and there is no
reason to deny due process protection to a civil contemnor merely
because he “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.”
There remains the troubling prospect of permitting “a
contemnor’s insistence on continuing his contumacious conduct
[to] inure[] to his benefit.” Majority Op., supra, at 16. I firmly
agree with the majority that an individual should not be allowed to
“thumb its nose” at the district court’s authority. Id. However, civil
contempt confinement may not be continued indefinitely on that
ground alone. The purpose of civil contempt is remedial;
vindicating the authority of the court is a punitive interest that falls
primarily within the ambit of criminal contempt. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
at 827-28; Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 72 (1957);
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42. Moreover, any termination of
Harris’s civil contempt confinement does not limit the District
Court’s ability to vindicate its authority through criminal contempt
proceedings. See Yates, 355 U.S. at 74-75; Penfield Co. of Cal. v.
SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947); United States v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 298-300 (1947). Thus, although the
 On this issue, although there is evidence in the record14
concerning Harris’s beliefs, his mental state, and his attacks on the
jurisdiction of the District Court, that evidence was not presented
to establish the improbability of future compliance.   
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court has a legitimate interest in vindicating its authority, I do not
view that interest to be a proper independent basis for continuing
civil contempt confinement where the confinement has lost its
remedial coercive effect. 
Applying the due process standard in this case does not lead
to a different result than that reached by the majority because
Harris did not carry his burden of establishing that there was no
substantial likelihood that continued confinement would
accomplish its coercive purpose. Harris relied solely on the length
of his confinement—almost four years when the District Court
ruled on Harris’s motion to terminate his contempt—to
demonstrate the futility of further confinement.  (App. 175.) While14
the length of a contemnor’s confinement is relevant for
determining its ongoing coercive effect, it is not dispositive. Braun,
600 F.2d at 425 & n.17, 428 (citing Catena v. Seidl, 321 A.2d 225
(N.J. 1974)). Further, the applicable standard of review in such
cases is highly deferential. See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d
34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a district court has “virtually
unreviewable discretion” in deciding “whether a civil contempt
sanction has lost any realistic possibility of having a coercive
effect”). On the present state of the record, there is no basis for
concluding that the District Court abused its discretion in deciding
to continue Harris’s civil contempt confinement. 
Although the majority and I reach the same result, I am
concerned that the majority goes too far—it completely shuts the
due process door to a person confined for civil contempt merely
because he “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.” In my
view, the better approach, and the approach mandated by our
precedential opinion in Braun, is to leave the due process door
open and to rely on the sound judgment of district courts in
determining whether, in a particular case, civil contempt
confinement continues to have a coercive effect. The fact that a
contemnor possesses the keys to his own jail cell justifies the
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imposition of an indefinite civil contempt sentence, but it does not
justify life-long confinement. 
